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We explore the relative efficiency of stock markets across countries using newly 
available data on transaction costs and the quality of the informational environment of 
stock markets. These new measures are constructed from firm-level stock returns in a 
panel of 60 countries in the period 2000–2004. We then develop a framework to 
understand the linkages between efficiency, liquidity and their determinants.  To give 
empirical content to the framework, we study the determinants of transactions costs and 
the quality of the informational environment. We find that some institutional 
arrangements—such as the availability of stock lending and short selling—and the 
openness of markets are associated with lower transactions costs. We also find that, 
although disclosure rules for directors and officers of listed firms are essential, the ability 
of shareholders to seek redress is more conducive to a better informational environment 
in stock markets. This in turn serves as the basis for the policy framework and 
recommendations for the East Asian region. In particular, the region needs to continue to 
strengthen the implementation and enforcement of corporate governance, to further 
enhance the market and institutional infrastructure, and focus on policy measures to 
foster a larger and more diversified investor base, to continue to see gains in the 
efficiency of stock markets. 
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Capital markets serve a fundamental purpose in allocating capital to its most productive 
uses. Their health and functioning is a central determinant of the growth and development 
process. Therefore a substantial part of the policy and research agenda of financial market 
development has focused on fostering the creation of stock and bond markets and 
increasing their size. Less attention has been paid to understanding the channels and 
policies to improve their efficiency. 
 
  Although the size of a market is in general correlated with other positive 
attributes, such as how they function of how stable they are, it is a distinctively different 
attribute from efficiency. Consider for example a large stock market as measured by 
market capitalization that only lists a few large firms which are rarely traded. Such a 
market will be ranked high in terms of size, but it will hardly be serving the purpose of an 
efficient allocation of resources. In that sense, the market will not be efficient. 
 
  The efficiency of a stock market is essentially its ability to intermediate resources 
from suppliers of capital to their most productive use. To do that, prices—the 
fundamental allocation instrument—must accurately reflect all information in the 
marketplace.  The finance literature has thus tested an immediate implication of 
efficiency: the lack of stock return predictability. A broad literature has followed this path 
for mature markets. However due to the lack of data, cross-country studies of stock 
market development have instead focused on the determinants of size, leaving efficiency 
implicit in the analysis. 
 
 In this paper, we concentrate on the efficiency of the East Asian stock markets, 
drawing on an analysis of stock markets around the world. To do this we focus on 
liquidity, which is a necessary condition for efficiency. Liquidity is the ability to buy and 
sell a good, in this case an asset, with ease. That is, to be able to buy or sell a good at 
will, at market prices, without incurring substantial costs to trade. It follows that every 
efficient market has to be liquid, although the converse is not necessarily true—a market 
can be liquid but inefficient.  
 
We present a framework to understand the channels that affect liquidity of capital 
markets. The size and depth of the market, the physical infrastructure of trading, the 
institutional foundations of markets, and the heterogeneity of the investor base interact to 
make a market more or less liquid. In turn, liquidity feeds back and affects the size of the 
market and the presence and willingness to trade of heterogeneous investors.  
 
We then empirically study the determinants of two attributes crucially related to 
liquid and efficient markets, namely transactions costs and the quality of the 
informational environment. We use newly available data that benchmarks countries in the 
efficiency of their stock markets—trading costs and the use of firm specific 
information—independently of their size. We find that the quality of the physical and 
market infrastructure, along with certain institutional characteristics of stock markets is 
associated with lower transactions costs. Also we find that certain institutional and legal   3
underpinnings are more conducive to a better informational environment in stock 
markets. This in turn serves as the basis for the policy framework and recommendations. 
As noted, our focus is on East Asia. To that end, we discuss in deeper detail the key 
institutional characteristics of their stock markets, the specific issues that affect them, and 
the policies that could further enhance the efficiency of these markets.  
 
2.  Literature survey 
 
There is an abundant literature on the informational efficiency of the US stock markets
1.  
This literature, starting with Samuelson (1965) and made famous by Fama (1970), takes 
advantage of the rich supply of detailed data for the US markets to test for a lack of return 
predictability –an implication of efficiency.  Depending of the conditioning informational 
set used to predict returns, one is able to test for strong, semi-strong, or weak efficiency 
as defined in the theoretical finance literature
2.  As we mentioned before, our focus is not 
to test formally for efficiency as defined in this literature, but rather to study the 
determinants of positive attributes correlated with efficient markets, such as liquidity, low 
transaction costs, and a good informational environment.  As such this paper is more 
closely related to recent cross-country studies of the determinants of positive stock 
market outcomes. 
 
In cross-country studies of stock market development most authors have used 
market capitalization as a summary measure of the quality of markets.  However, as 
mentioned before, the size of a market –as measured by market capitalization—is a 
distinct characteristic from its efficiency. Large markets may not be liquid or may not 
function efficiently. A large market capitalization may represent only a few firms and can 
be affected by rapid price changes. Furthermore, its calculation may vary across markets, 
depending on the use of the float or total shares outstanding (float plus restricted shares).  
 
Some cross-country studies, such as La Porta et al (2005) and De la Torre and 
Schmukler (2005), attempt to use an outcome variable more related to efficiency to 
complement market capitalization.  La Porta et al (2005) in one of their specifications use 
value traded as one of a set of stock market outcomes.  Their focus is to study what 
particular specifications of securities markets laws matter for market development.  They 
group those characteristics broadly into those related to “private monitoring” and those 
that depend on “public enforcement” of the law.  They find that markets with more 
private monitoring are more efficient –as proxied by value traded— than those that rely 
on the public enforcement of the law. 
 
On a study that focuses on the development of capital markets in Latin America, 
De la Torre and Schmukler (2004) present cross-country panel regressions on the 
                                                 
1 See Fama’s (1970 and 1991) survey articles and Schwert (2003) for overviews of the paths that the literature has 
followed in testing for market efficiency.  
2 In the theoretical finance literature, a market is weakly-efficient if it reflects all available past information.  Semi-
strong form efficiency occurs when prices reflect all available public information, and strong form efficiency is when 
prices reflect all available public and private information.  Researchers disagree on the actual level of efficiency of 
mature markets. 
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determinants of stock market development.  Among their specifications they report 
results on regressions that study the determinants of value traded
3.  They find that richer 
countries, as measured by GDP per capita, tend to have more liquid markets.  Also, a 
stable macroeconomic environment –proxied by low government budget deficits, and a 
more open economy, proxied by large equity inflows, tend also to have more liquid 
markets.  Countries that reformed their trading environment, particularly the 
infrastructure of the exchanges, and the enforcement of insider trading laws, also saw 
increases in their trading activity. 
 
Some other studies have considered the link between specific mechanisms and 
market efficiency in a cross-country basis.  Bris, Goetzman, and Zhu (2006) analyze 
whether short sales restrictions affect the efficiency of the market.  They find some 
empirical evidence that short-sales restrictions inhibit downward price discovery.  Morck, 
Yeung, and Yu (2000) study the comovement of stock returns in markets across the 
world, interpret this indicator as a measure of efficiency, and perform a statistical 
analysis of its determinants.  We use their measure and describe it in detail in section 4. 
There are some regional studies as well.  For example, Ngugi, Muirinde, and Green 
(2003) study the impact of reforms on stock exchanges in Africa.  They find that the 
modernization of trading systems leads to greater price efficiency and lower volatility. 
 
In this paper we focus on a cross-country study of the determinants of two 
specific attributes related to market efficiency: low transaction costs and a high quality 
informational environment.  As in the literature on stock market development we focus 
on cross-country determinants of positive outcomes, but as in the literature of mature 
markets, the focus is on efficiency. 
 
                                                 
3 Value traded (the value of stock trades in a year divided by the size of the economy) is a commonly used indicator of 
liquidity.  However, it is an imperfect measure since its value can change without any increase is the volume of trades, 
for example, if prices rise.  For that reason turnover (the value of stock trades in a year divided by market 
capitalization) is a better measure because is not affected by prices.  De la Torre and Schmukler (2005) indicate that 
they also ran the regressions using turnover without any significant difference in the results. 
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3.  A conceptual framework 
 
In figure 1 we present a summary of the framework we use to understand the links 
between efficiency, liquidity, and their determinants.  As Lesmond (2005) notes, 
liquidity, by its very nature, is difficult to define and even more difficult to measure. A 
simple working definition of liquidity is the ease with which an asset can be bought or 
liquidated (turned into cash), without any price discounts at a particular point in time. If a 
market is illiquid, it cannot be efficient, since transactions will not be executed 
immediately to reflect new information.  
 
Figure 1: Factors affecting liquidity and efficiency of the securities markets 
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Liquidity or its lack, will be reflected in, and affected by, the availability of 
accurate information with which to price securities. Also by transactions costs since these 
factors-along with the size and the heterogeneity of the investor base—will influence the 
extent to which there is a active participation of investors and hence the ease with which 
assets can be turned to cash. (A diversity of investors with different risk appetites makes 
a divergence of views more likely and fosters trading.) 
 
Weak information disclosure affects the efficiency of the securities markets 
directly because if it is poor, it will not reflect fundamentals. It also affects efficiency 
indirectly, through liquidity, because a market with poor information is likely to exhibit 
higher price volatility and discourage trading and price discovery.  In turn, the quality of 
information available for investors to accurately price securities will depend on 
disclosure standards and practices, on the underlying accounting and auditing standards 
and practices and on the effective exercise of corporate governance overall.   6
 
Transactions costs comprise both the explicit costs of trading—such as 
commissions, settlement fees and taxes—and the implicit costs of trading, which 
represents the opportunity costs of delaying or not executing a trade. The latter exist 
because orders, may, as a result of their size and/or scarcity of counterpart orders on the 
market execute at high prices (if they are buy orders) or low prices (if they are sell 
orders). A market with high transactions costs will see less trading and have fewer price 
movements in response to relevant news and will therefore be less liquid and less 
efficient. Both market infrastructure and the availability of “supporting” infrastructure—
such as well functioning repo markets, securities lending, and derivatives markets, can 
affect transactions costs.  
 
4.  Methodology and data 
 
Our methodology will focus on giving empirical content to the various links presented in 
figure 1.  That is, we would like to study the determinants of liquidity, as well as the 
determinants of the various factors that affect liquidity –such as transaction costs, and the 
quality of the informational environment. 
 
The traditional indicators used to measure liquidity in stock markets are turnover 
and value. They complement market capitalization for conventional assessments.  In this 
paper, we use the turnover ratio rather than value traded.  The turnover ratio is the value 
of stock trades over a year divided by market capitalization.  Value traded is the value of 
stock trades in a year divided by Gross Domestic Product.  Since the value of trading 
increases with prices, there can be an improvement in the value traded measure without 
any corresponding increase in liquidity or efficiency.  Hence, we prefer to use turnover 
which is not affected by this price effect, since prices are both in the numerator and 
denominator.  Figure 2 shows the distribution of average stock market turnover ratios 
(during 2000-2004) of 109 countries across the world. A point to note is that most 
countries have fairly illiquid stock markets. Within the East Asia region, Indonesia and 
the Philippines in particular have low turnover ratios at 38 percent and 10 percent 
respectively. Only Korea has a high turnover ratio of over 250 percent (Figure 3). As can 
be seen from Figure 4 however, turnover ratios do tend to improve with per capita GDP 
(as an indicator of the general level of development) and actually China, Indonesia, 
Korea and Thailand are relatively well placed given their per capita income levels.  
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Figure 2.  Distribution of countries in terms 
of turnover ratios; histogram 
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As shown in figure 1, transaction costs are a fundamental determinant of liquidity 
and efficiency.  Measuring transactions costs, however, is difficult. As mentioned above, 
transactions costs cover the explicit costs of trading and the implicit costs of execution.  
Explicit costs represent the commissions, fees, and market impact of a trade
4.  Although 
even this is not entirely straightforward to measure, some companies specialize on 
collecting and making available these costs.  For example, Table 1 shows the Elkins-
McSherry trading costs in selected equity markets. 
                                                 
4 Some costs such as “market impact” are not straightforward to classify as either implicit or explicit.   8
 















Indonesia 0.3  47.7  10.6  9.9  68.1 
Korea  34.3  29.3 12.4 19.2  60.9 
Malaysia 1.6  34.2  6.1  15.7  55.9 
Philippines  0.4  48.5 34.4 11.3  94.1 
Thailand 1.0  43.7  1.8  11.4  56.9 
Hong  Kong  1.5  22.3 10.7 11.3  44.3 
Singapore 3.1  25.7  2.0  13.8  14.5 
         
Memorandum:         
Japan  14.7  12.9 0.3 6.3  19.5 
Canada  17.5  20.3 0.2 6.5  27.0 
France  31.0  17.9 0.4 7.7  36.0 



















USA  (NYSE)  25.0  18.2 0.3 7.8  26.3 
         
Chile  0.7  29.1 10.2 15.7  55.0 
Greece  12.9  28.7 19.2 10.9  58.8 
Mexico  2.1  26.3 0.1 8.2  34.6 
Peru 3.3  20.5  0.5  25.2  46.2 
Spain 14.1  17.5  0.5  11.8  29.7 
Turkey 0.0  31.4  2.7  20.6  54.7 
Source: Elkins McSherry trading costs (2004). 
 
Implicit trading costs represent the opportunity costs of delaying a trade if 
conditions are not appropriate, the expected cost of failure to complete the trade because 
of physical infrastructure failure, and any premium due to the illiquidity of the market.  
These costs are of course hard to measure.  
 
In this paper we rely on a methodology developed by Lesmond et al (1999) that 
captures both explicit and implicit costs.  Their method exploits the fact that a trade only 
happens if the benefit of the transaction exceeds the cost. Hence, by using the fraction of 
zero-return days (i.e. when trades do not happen), one is able to disentangle 
econometrically an estimate of transaction costs. The underlying assumption is that the 
marginal trader will trade on new information not already incorporated in the price of a 
security only if the trade yields a profit net of transaction costs.  Hence there will be an 
observed difference between the “real” and the perceived return.  To extract a measure of 
transaction costs, a Limited Dependent Variable (LDV) model is estimated.     9
 
The relation between measured returns Rjt and true returns R*jt is given as: 
 
  R*jt = βjRmt + εjt,  (1)
where 
  Rjt = R*jt –α1j     if R*jt <α1j,   
  Rjt = 0      if α1j < R*jt < α2j,   
  Rjt = R*jt – α2j   if R*jt > α2j.   
 
In this setup j indexes firms, t indexes time, and m represents the market.  For 
firm j, the threshold for trades on negative information is α1j, while the threshold for 
trades on positive information is α2j.  The difference α2j – α1j is a measure of the 
proportional round-trip costs for the competitive, marginal investor. This measure of 
transaction costs is then aggregated by country, taking the average over firms. (See 
Lesmond et al (1999) for an in depth discussion).  
 
From figure 1, the second element associated with liquidity, as mentioned in our 
framework above, is the quality of available information. For informational quality and 
efficiency of stock markets, we rely on the stock return synchronicity measure (R
2) of 
Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000).  Synchronicity measures the extent to which individual 
stock returns are correlated with the market return.  If a high proportion of stock returns 
move together, then that particular market is not very efficient in conveying firm-specific 
information.  On the other hand, the lower the correlation between individual stock 
returns and the market indicates that the market is more efficient in transmitting and 
using richer information sets. 
 
Following Morck et al (2000), the stock return synchronicity measure is 
calculated from the R
2’s of the following regressions: 
 
  rit = αi + β1irmjt + β2i[rus,t + ejt] + εit,  (2)
 
where i represents firms, j represents countries, t a two-week period time index, rmjt is the 
domestic market return index, rus,t is the United States market return, and ejt is the rate of 
change in the exchange rate per US dollar.  Certain adjustments described in their paper 
are made for the specific cases of the US (set β2i = 0) and the Far East economies (lag US 
returns one day to reflect time differences).  Countries are the ranked according to the 
R
2’s, where a lower R
2 indicates less co-movement across stock returns –and hence, 
higher firm-specific informational efficiency. (See Morck et al (2000) for an in depth 
discussion and Morck and Yeung (2002) for a non-technical overview).  
 
Figure 5 below shows the average scores in synchronicity (measuring 
informational quality) and transactions costs by region. As can be seen, the East Asia 
region has relatively high synchronicity scores.   10
 
Figure 5. Average scores in transactions costs and quality of information by region 
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To study the determinants of transaction costs across countries, we use a set of 
institutional and physical infrastructure variables.  Our hypothesis is that physical 
infrastructure as well as certain institutional characteristics, or what we call 
complementary infrastructure—the existence of repo markets, securities lending, margin 
trading and derivatives markets—affect transactions costs and liquidity (see Figure 1 
above).  In particular, we use dummy variables regarding the presence of derivative 
markets, short selling, and stock lending, to study if the presence of these crucial 
institutional arrangements are associated with lower costs of trading.  We also 
incorporate a measure for the efficiency of the physical clearing and settlement 
infrastructure in the form of days until final settlement.  We also include in the 
regressions, macroeconomic control variables in the form of inflation and the government 
budget balance, as well as the extent of equity capital inflows. 
 
For the determinants of the informational quality of stock markets, we focus on 
indicators of the quality of investor protection for shareholders.  We choose to use these 
variables only, since it is notoriously difficult to find variables that are able to explain 
synchronicity beyond GDP per capita (Morck and Yeung (2002)).  In particular we take 
three measures from the World Bank Doing Business indicators: disclosure, director 
liability, and shareholder suits.  The three of them are a measure of the strength of 
minority shareholder protections against director’s misuse of corporate assets for personal 
gain.  In other words, by measuring how effective securities markets laws are regarding 
self-dealing, they serve as a proxy for the broader law and order environment in which 
stock markets operate.  The disclosure index captures the transparency of disclosure and 
approval of related-party transactions.  The extent of director liability index measure the 
degree of liability of those involved in self-dealing acts.  And the ease of shareholder 
suits index captures the ability of shareholders to sue officers and directors for 
misconduct
5.  
                                                 
5 We chose to use Doing Business indicators instead of the earlier measures from La Porta et al (2006) and Djankov et 
al (2005) on which they are based, because they have broader country coverage and a consistent methodology applied 
in each country.  In particular, the way the three measures are obtained is by assuming a specific business transaction 
that involves self dealing.  There are two companies B (for buyer) and S (for seller).  A hypothetical Mr. James owns   11
 
In order to investigate the determinants of market efficiency, we would like to 
create a summary measure of efficiency that lumps together the two dimensions of 
liquidity: transaction costs and the informational quality of stock markets and then study 
the determinants of this “composite efficiency measure”.  Figure 6 plots such a composite 
index.  It is constructed from the transaction costs and synchronicity measures, first by 
standardizing each one (subtracting the mean and dividing by variance), and then 
averaging the two measures. 
 
 



























However, the difficulty with this index is that its components move in opposite 
directions in many countries in our sample. That is, it would appear that there are a 
significant number of countries which have relatively low transactions costs as a result of 
good physical or market infrastructure but at the same time rank low in terms of the 
quality of information disclosure and the exercise of corporate governance, resulting in 
high price synchronicity. This point can be seen from Figure 7, which shows the 
distribution of the countries in our sample (by region) along the two dimensions of 
transactions costs and quality of information disclosure. A sizable number of countries 
rank well in terms of transactions costs but not synchronicity, but equally a number of 
countries rank well on synchronicity but not in terms of transactions costs. As can also be 
seen from the figure, about 75 percent of the EAP countries in our sample rank in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
60% of B, owns 90% of S, and has a majority in both boards of directors.  Company S wants to dispose of some assets 
and Mr. James proposes that company B buy them, at a price that is above market value.  The transaction is approved, 
and the mandated disclosures are made.  However, since the transaction is unfair, shareholders of B sue Mr. James and 
any other parties that approved the transaction.  Using this common framework, Doing Business then ask lawyers from 
each country a set of questions regarding what disclosures should have been obligatorily made, what is the specific 
liability that directors and managers face, and how easy it is for shareholders to sue those who were responsible.  A 
score is then computed for each of these categories. 
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bottom half of the distribution in terms of the quality of disclosure and 58 percent rank in 
the bottom half in terms of transactions costs (i.e. have high transactions costs). Also 
none of the countries in the region fall in the top right hand quadrant which represents the 
top half of the distribution of countries in both transactions costs and information (low 
transactions costs and good quality of information).  
 
Figure 7. Distribution of sample on the dimensions of  
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Consequently we run separate regressions for transaction costs and for 
synchronicity to study their determinants.  We run standard pooled OLS regressions with 
robust errors, as well as random effects panel regressions. 
 
5.  Empirical results 
 
Table 2 reports regression results on the determinants of stock return synchronicity.   
These regressions are pooled OLS with robust standard errors.  In all specifications we 
control for the level of GDP per capita, since richer countries tend to have more 
developed financial sectors in all dimensions.  In columns 1 to 3 we report results on the 
specifications that include only one of our three proxies for the quality of investor 
protection.  In columns 3 and 4 we include two of them, while in column 5 we include all 
three.  Some results stand out.  As expected, countries with higher GDP per capita tend to 
have a higher informational quality in their stock markets as measured by stock return   13
synchronicity.  As is well established the overall institutional and law and order 
framework of a country is highly correlated with its level of development.  Turning to the 
investor protection determinants of synchronicity, we find that disclosure is not 
significant in these specifications.  This result is somewhat counterintuitive, since one 
would think that the easy policy solution to facilitate more firm-specific information is 
more disclosure.  Similarly, the extent of the director liability index is only significant by 
itself, but not in any other specification.  What matters for the informational quality of 
stock markets is the ease of shareholder suits, which is significant in all of our 
specifications.  An increase in the ease of suits from shareholders to officers or directors 
that misuse corporate assets reduces stock return synchronicity –which means a more 
efficient market.  It is not surprising that the ease of shareholder suits reduces stock return 
synchronicity, and thus implies more informational efficiency.  Shareholder suits, or at 
least the threat of them, will make effective the disclosure mandated in securities markets 
laws.  That is, if directors and management perceive a risk of not disclosing material 
information to the markets, or of disclosing inaccurate information, an increase in the 
ease of shareholder suits will bring more firm-specific information to the market, and 
hence less synchronicity of returns. This result is notable since most studies that have 
looked at the determinants of synchronicity have not found any significant determinants 
beyond GDP per capita and the overall level of corruption in the economy (see Morck 
and Yeung (2002)). 
 
On the determinants of transactions costs, Table 3 reports pooled OLS regression 
results with robust errors.  GDP per capita is again always significant:  richer countries 
tend to have more developed markets and lower transactions costs in their stock markets.  
Specification 1 shows that short selling of securities is strongly associated with lower 
transaction costs.  We are not surprised since a market that allows –and exhibits- short 
selling attracts not only those investors and traders that expect an increase in prices, but 
also those that bet on the opposite direction.  This means higher liquidity in those markets 
and thus lower costs of trading.    Short trades assure better market conditions since they 
allow traders with heterogeneous views to profit also during negative market 
environments.  Short sales also minimize the “analyst bias” which tends to make good 
news more prevalent than negative ones, and the ability to short sale might help stabilize 
markets by identifying overpriced stocks.   
 
Probably a more important institutional feature is the ability to borrow and lend 
stocks.  After all, short selling relies on this ability, but it also opens up other advantages 
to traders and investors. In column 2, stock lending is significant at the 10% level, and in 
column 6 stock lending is significant at the 5% level, and with a large coefficient.   
Markets that don’t allow for stock lending tend to have higher transaction costs. The 
cross-country variation in days to final settlement of stocks trading does not significantly 
affect transaction costs.   
 
Options and futures trading does not seem to affect transaction costs. However, 
this could be a problem of our variable since it is only a dummy that equals zero if no 
trading in these instruments occurs at all and one if there is at least the trading of one 
instrument.  Such broad aggregate may not be capturing the advantages that options and   14
futures bring to hedging, and hence in attracting more liquidity into the market.  Finally, 
inflows of portfolio equity are always significant in reducing transaction costs.  This 
might not only reflect the added liquidity in the market, but also the added heterogeneity 
of the investor base which facilitates trading, and hence reduces the costs of trading. 
 
Table 2. Determinants of Stock Return Synchronicity 
 
This table shows least square regressions estimated using pooled OLS for a panel of 50 countries between 
2000 and 2004.  A constant is estimated but not reported.  t-statistics using robust standard errors are shown 
in brackets. An * means significance at 5 percent.  See Appendix table 1 for the definition of the variables. 
Dependent variable: stock return synchronicity 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
        
Log GDP per capita  -0.02*  -0.02*  -0.02  -0.02*  -0.02  -0.02* 
  [-3.77] [-3.34] [-3.15] [-2.75] [-2.73] [-3.15] 
Disclosure  0.00    0.00   0.00 
  [0.59]    [1.10]   [0.97] 
Director liability    -0.01*    -0.01  0.00   
   [-1.88]   [-1.56] [-1.46]   
Shareholder  suits     -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* 
     [-3.37] [-3.34] [-3.21] [-3.48] 
        
        
        
        
        
Num. Observations  223  223 223 223 223  223
R-Squared  0.05 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.10 
 
Table 3. Determinants of Transaction Costs 
 
This table shows least square regressions estimated using pooled OLS for a panel of 50 countries between 
2000 and 2004.  A constant is estimated but not reported.  t-statistics using robust standard errors are shown 
in brackets. An * means significance at 5 percent.  See Appendix table 1 for the definition of the variables. 
Dependent variable: transaction costs 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
         
Log GDP per capita  -1.93  -2.16*  -2.44* -2.17* -2.32* -2.97* -2.78* 
  [-1.76] [-2.03] [-2.10] [-5.28] [-2.00] [-2.19] [-2.07] 
Short  Selling  -2.77*       -5.02 
  [-2.10]       [-1.34 
Stock  Lending    -3.47     -4.09*  
    [-1.58]     [-1.93]  
Settlement period      -0.17      0.12  0.18 
     [-0.49]      [0.42]  [0.63] 
Equity  inflows      -0.08*   -0.08*  0.09* 
      [-5.51]   [-3.01]  [-2.65] 
Options and futures tr.          -1.16  0.17  -0.02 
       [-0.94]  [0.16]  [-0.02] 
         
Num.  Observations  50 50 50  229 50 49 49 
R-Squared  0.23 0.24 0.18 0.11 0.18 0.35 0.34 
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6.  Policy priorities for East Asia 
 
6.1. Strengthening the implementation and enforcement of corporate governance 
 
The empirical results suggest that corporate governance—as proxied by director liability 
and shareholder suits—is a significant determinant of stock market efficiency. In 
particular, it is an important determinant of the extent to which individual stock prices 
move in response to firm specific information.  
 
As Table 4 shows, the EA region now fares quite well in terms of the coverage of 
securities laws with respect to these aspects, although individual countries, notably the 
Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia score relatively low in one or more aspects of the 
laws.  
 
Table 4.  Ratings of different aspects of securities laws 
 




Anti self dealing 
standards index  
      
China 10.0  1.0  4.0 
Indonesia 8.0  5.0  3.0 
Korea 7.0  2.0  7.0 
Malaysia 10.0  9.0  7.0 
Philippines 1.0  2.0  7.0 
Thailand 10.0  2.0  6.0 
Hong Kong  10.0  8.0  9.0 
Singapore 10.0  9.0  9.0 
      
Memorandum:      
Japan 7.0  6.0  8.0 
Canada 8.0  9.0  8.0 
Germany 5.0  5.0  5.0 
UK 10.0  7.0  7.0 
US 7.0  9.0  9.0 
Chile 8.0  6.0  5.0 
Greece 1.0 3.0  5.0 
Mexico 8.0  5.0 5.0 
Peru 8.0  5.0  7.0 
Spain   5.0  6.0  4.0 
Turkey 8.0 4.0  4.0 
East Asia  5.2  4.4  6.1 
ECA 4.7  3.8  6.0 
Latin America  4.3  5.1  5.8 
OECD 6.3 5.0  6.6 
Score ranges from 10 (highest) -0 (lowest). 
 
 
While on average the region scores well in terms of the coverage of some key 
aspects in the securities laws—including disclosure—the extent of disclosure in practice 
varies quite widely across countries. Figure 8 below shows an analysis done by Standard   16
and Poors of the extent of disclosure practiced by firms in their annual reports in selected 

























































































































































































































Source: S&P (2005) 
                                                 
6 The analysis looks at disclosure of several elements including the disclosure of related party transactions that is 
covered in the disclosure requirements index in Table 4.   17
Here firms in Hong Kong (China) and Singapore score the best on average, 
although there is quite a large range in the performance of firms in Singapore (largely 
reflecting the performance of firms that are incorporated outside Singapore), followed by 
Malaysia, Korea, Thailand and Indonesia in that order. (The analysis did not cover China 
or the Philippines). 
 
 
More broadly, the importance of corporate governance has increasingly been recognized 
and, over the past few years, countries in the region have made significant efforts to 
strengthen the various elements that shape it. Table 5 provides market perceptions of 
where countries in East Asia stand with respect to the key elements of corporate 
governance. Rules and regulations pertaining to the exercise of corporate governance—
which include well defined rights that can protect outside shareholders from the actions 
of controlling shareholders, regulations that ensure the equitable treatment of 
shareholders and well defined responsibilities of boards—are seen to still require 
strengthening in several countries—more notably in China




Table 5. Corporate governance scores—a market perspective 
 
Economy  Rules and 
regulations 
Enforcement  Political 
and 
regulatory 
IGAAP  CG culture  Economy 
score 
China  5.3 4.2 5.0  7.5  2.3  4.8 
Indonesia  5.3 2.7 3.8  6.0  2.7  4.0 
Malaysia  7.1 5.0 5.0  9.0  4.6  6.0 
Korea  6.1 5.0 5.0  8.0  5.0  5.8 
Philippines  5.8 3.1 5.0  8.5  3.1  5.0 
Thailand  6.1 3.8 5.0  8.5  3.5  5.3 
Hong  Kong  6.6 5.8 7.5  9.0  4.6  6.7 
Singapore  7.9 6.5 8.1  9.5  5.8  7.4 
Score ranges from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest). Source: CLSA 2005 
 
The enforcement of the rules is seen to be more problematic across a larger 
number of countries in the region. Indeed, while there are some aspects of the regulations 
pertaining to shareholder rights that could be strengthened in several countries, the key 
challenge for countries the region now lies in the implementation and enforcement of the 
regulations that are already in place.  
 
In terms of accounting and auditing, East Asian countries are at different stages of 
convergence with international standards. From the market’s perspective, China and 
Indonesia are seen to be the furthest off from international standards and practices at 
present. Indeed, in China, while the government’s policy is to bring local accounting 
standards into line with international standards, there are currently significant 
                                                 
7 China has recently amended its Company Law, with several amendments relating to the strengthening of shareholder 
rights. 
8 These assessments are based on a number of parameters under each category (see Credit Lyonnais Asia Pacific 2005 
for the list of the parameters). 
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discrepancies. Indonesia is much closer to international standards, but there are some 
differences still.  
 
The last column of Table 5 reflects the market’s rating of the overall corporate 
governance culture—as manifested by the degree to which institutional and retail 
investors are engaged in actively promoting corporate governance. Here again, there is 
room for further strengthening, particularly in Indonesia, China and the Philippines. 
 
6.2. Enhancing market and institutional infrastructure 
 
Well-functioning market infrastructure and supporting infrastructure—such as repo 
markets, margin trading, securities lending and derivatives markets—can reduce 
transactions costs.  
 
Although in our empirical results, market infrastructure does not turn out to be 
significant, it is important to note that the only proxy that we have to capture market 
infrastructure is the number of days to settlement. 
 
In any case, in terms market infrastructure, countries in EA are well placed, with 
almost all jurisdictions having fairly advanced clearing and settlement systems with 
recommended features to minimize the various risks associated with pre-settlement and 
settlement of securities. This is borne out by the GSCS benchmark clearance and 
settlement ratings and by the Thomas Murray post settlement scores for countries in the 
region (see Table 6).  
 
Table 6.  Scores on pre-settlement and post settlement risks 
 
Economy  GSCS benchmark clearance 
and settlement score 
Post settlement 
score 
China 92.5  A- 
Indonesia 68.5  A 
Korea 97.3  A+ 
Malaysia 93.3  A+ 
Philippines 92.4  A 
Thailand 93.6  A 
Hong Kong  n.a  A+ 
Singapore n.a.  AA- 
    
Memorandum:    
Greece 85.0  A+ 
Japan n.a.  A+ 
Mexico 90.5  A+ 
Peru 97.8  A- 
Turkey 98.3  A 
Venezuela, RB  72.6  BBB 
Source: GSCS and Thomas Murray.  GSCS compares the settlement efficiency of markets, 
incorporating average trade size, local market interest rates, the proportion of trades that fail, 
and the length of time for which they fail.  Thomas Murray produces ratings of post-trade risk 
exposures according to various criteria of clearing and settlement, safekeeping, and asset 
servicing.  The ratings follow a standard alpha scale from AAA to C. 
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It is in the “supporting infrastructure”—such as repo markets, securities lending, 
margin trading and derivatives—that the East Asian countries vary quite widely (see 
Table 7). Our empirical results suggest that short selling is a significant factor in reducing 
transactions costs (equation 1). In several countries though, short selling is not practiced. 
In a few cases, this is because short selling is not allowed. In others, while allowed, it 
may not be practiced because of limitations in securities lending (a necessary element for 
efficient short selling to take place). All countries, (with the exception of China which at 
present does not allow margin trading with respect to either the short or long positions), 
however allow and practice margin purchases.  
 
  The merit of margin or leverage trading, particularly with respect to short 
positions, is often debated. The argument for allowing margin trading is to introduce 
liquidity into the system. An argument against margin trading though is that it can fuel 
feedback trading and thus destabilize the market. A further argument is that margin 
trading, especially short selling, can make the market too susceptible to manipulation: in 
particular, a short seller’s loss when short squeezed can be unlimited while a margin 
purchaser’s losses will be limited to his initial exposure
9. Thus short selling poses 
potential systemic risks. Often therefore countries prohibit short selling (or even if not 
explicitly prohibited, the lack of an efficient stock lending system effectively makes short 
selling impractical for both financial and operational reasons).  
 
Nonetheless, market symmetry—in terms of allowing both margin purchases and 
short sales is important for liquidity; in a leveraged and symmetrical market, a trader can 
efficiently buy and sell at minimal and uniformly applicable costs, immediately in 
response to new market information. Asymmetrical market liquidity—in which securities 
investments can be financially leveraged through margin selling but short sales are 
prohibited—can lead to long run deviations of stock prices from their fundamental value, 
reducing liquidity in a declining market and delaying market recovery. Moreover, even if 
all margin trading is prohibited, with the goal of ensuring symmetry, it is harder to 
enforce a restriction on margin purchases than on short sales, since it is hard to tell 
whether the funds used for purchasing a particular stock were borrowed or not, given that 
money is fungible. In contrast restrictions on short selling are easier to enforce, since to 
borrow securities systematically for short selling requires a stock lending system to be 
formally established and efficiently operated. Thus when margin trading is prohibited, a 




Arguably therefore it may be better for countries to consider allowing both margin 
purchases and short sales and ensuring that the requisite elements for margin trading 
within reasonable bounds of safety are in place. In addition to having margin accounts, 
and margin lending, one key element for short selling is an adequate securities lending 
system—that allows short sellers to be able to borrow shorted stocks. In fact, our 
                                                 
9 In a margin purchase, losses are limited to (purchase price) x (margin ratio), whereas gains are unlimited at 
[(unlimited sale price) x (margin ratio) – purchase price]. In a short sale, losses are unlimited at [(unlimited purchase 
price) x (the margin ratio) – sale price], while the gains are limited to (sale price) x (margin ratio).   
10 For a deeper discussion of margin trading see Bris et al (2003) and Endo and Rhee (2005).   20
empirical results also point to the importance of securities lending in reducing 
transactions costs (equation 6).  
 
As Table 7 shows, currently stock lending is not allowed in a couple of the East 
Asian countries, countries.  Moreover, simply allowing—in terms of regulation—stock 
lending is not enough. For countries to successfully introduce stock lending, certain 
elements need to be in place. First, a stock lending system must be efficient and robust 
not only to facilitate short sales but also to prevent abnormal short squeezes
11. Wide 
participation by stock lenders in a stock lending system will reduce the risk of a short 
squeeze by making it easier and less expensive to cover short positions. In addition to 
stock brokers, lender of stocks can be securities depositories, custodial banks, investment 
managers and institutional investors (insurance and pension funds). In this regard 
Malaysia recently introduced measures to strengthen the securities lending facility for 
principal dealers and has also facilitated securities borrowing and lending via ISCAP 
which is a web based custodian system developed by the central bank, Bank Negara.  
 
Second, since stock lending and borrowing exposes the transactions parties to the 
credit risk of the counterparty and to the market risk of loaned securities, it can 
potentially lead to systemic risk due to the leveraged nature of the short sales underlying 
stock loans. The legal, regulatory, and supervisory framework of stock lending has to be 
comprehensive and coherent so that participants in the system can comply with relevant 
rules and regulations and manage risks properly. There is often a tradeoff between 
efficiency and robustness of the system and finding the right balance is important.  
 
Third, since the stock borrower pledges collateral with the lender and the 
borrower’s collateral is marked to market daily and subject to margin calls, stock lending 
poses a new challenge to the regulator in terms of collateral management. The regulator 
needs to address at least two aspects of risk management. The first relates to the variety 
of risks that the stock lender may be faced with, namely credit, interest, price, liquidity, 
operational and legal risks, depending on what sort of securities are made eligible for 
collateral. Thus regulators need to ensure that stock lenders have the necessary risk 
management processes in place. The second pertains to the scope of participants in the 
stock lending market. If stock lenders—individuals and institutions—are under different 
supervisory jurisdictions, the coherence and coordination of risk management regulation 
applicable to different categories of stock lenders could be a challenge.  
 
Finally, within the ambit of supporting infrastructure, the development of 
derivatives markets would help reduce transactions costs. Although the results of our 
empirical analysis do not find derivatives to be a significant determinant of transactions 
costs, one of the problems with our measures, as mentioned above, is that it is a binary 
variable that captures simply whether there is no trading in these instruments at all, and or 
if there is at least trading in one instrument and as such is a very broad aggregate measure 
                                                 
11 A short squeeze is a situation in which the lack of supply or an excess demand for a traded stock forces the price 
upward.  For example, if a stock price starts to rise rapidly, short sellers may be forced to liquidate and cover their 
positions by purchasing the stock.  This will push up the stock price even higher.   21
that may not be capturing the potential benefits of derivatives. In principle, derivatives 
can be an important in lowering explicit transactions costs.   
 
Although five main derivatives are traded in East Asian markets (foreign 
exchange products in which the region is estimated to account for 15 percent of the 
global trading); interest rate derivatives (about 2 percent of OTC trading and slightly 
more than 2 percent of the ETD trading); equity derivatives (under 4 percent of global 
trading); commodity derivatives and credit derivatives (among the fastest growing 
products), the bulk of the derivatives activity in the region is concentrated in Hong Kong 
(China), Singapore, and Korea.  
 
Clearly though derivatives markets need to be developed within an appropriate 
framework of solid product design, regulation and sound market infrastructure (Fratzcher 
(2006)).  
 
6.3  Fostering a larger, more diversified investor base 
 
In our empirical results, portfolio equity inflows are found to be a significant positive 
determinant in reducing transactions costs. In fact, these flows could be taken as a proxy 
measure of a larger and more heterogeneous investor base. A more diversified investor 
base with different preferences and appetites encourages trading and can enhance 
liquidity.  
 
One of the key elements in this regard is the development of the contractual 
savings industry—that is the pensions and insurance industry.  
 
Pension fund assets are still relatively small in most of the EA countries as the 
schemes are still relatively immature. With the exception of Singapore and Malaysia, 
pension fund assets amount to less than 50 percent in all the other countries. Even with at 
current asset size, however, it would be possible for pension funds to make more of a 
contribution to capital markets than they do at present. In general, with the exception of 
the main schemes in Hong Kong (where pension assets are held in equities) currently the 
asset allocation appears to be mainly confined to government securities and bank 
deposits. In the case of defined benefit schemes (such as the main pension schemes in 
Malaysia, Thailand), these could make a greater contribution to capital markets if an asset 
liability framework was adopted. The managers of pension funds have traditionally 
focused on investment management, managing their assets against a return benchmark for 
an asset class. This approach is not appropriate for defined contribution schemes given 
their predetermined liabilities or obligations. Rather the focus should be on liability 
benchmarking—whereby a liability benchmark is constructed and assets and liabilities 
are managed with regard to the correlation between the two. For defined contribution 
schemes, such as those in Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore, an argument could be 
made for increasing the annuitization component. This would improve both the inter- and 
intra-generational risk sharing properties of the systems and from the perspective of 
capital market developed, would likely increase the demand for securities (See Impavido 
and Sourrouille (2006)).    22
 
At the same time though it would be important to strengthen governance 
structures and risk management capacity of these institutions before they invest a greater 
proportion of their assets in the securities markets. 
 
The asset size of the life insurance industry for the East Asia region as a whole 
amounted to US$ 362 billion at end 2004. In fact, the asset size is relatively small in most 
economies. Much of the impact on capital markets from the insurance industry is likely to 
come from increased coverage and a growing variety of products. There is considerable 
scope for further development of the industry, particularly in China, Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Thailand. One factor that may be reducing the role of the insurance 
industry in capital market development is the presence of many small players in several 
countries, partly as a result of low entry barriers in terms of minimum capital 
requirements. 
 
The further development of the institutional investor asset base needs to be 
complemented by measures that facilitate cross-border investments and financial 
integration. Indeed, since the 1997 crisis, policymakers in the region have undertaken 
several measures at the regional level to foster greater regional financial integration, 
particularly with respect to the bond markets. Equity markets are more integrated than 
bond markets—both globally and within the region. Nonetheless, in several countries in 
the region a still sizable proportion of the shares remains closed to cross border investors 
As of end 2004, foreign investors did not have access to 42 percent of the stock market in 
the Philippines, 41 percent in China and 36 percent in Thailand 
12,13.   
 
                                                 
12 However, China is currently undertaking major reforms to increase investors’ access to shares. Thailand has also 
recently loosened restrictions on foreign investors. These figures are based on the IFC’s Investible Return Index (IFCI), 
which includes a subset of stocks included in IFC’s Global Index (IFCG), both now managed by Standard and Poors. 
Stocks in the IFCI are selected using a two step process: first, S&P determines which securities may be legally held by 
foreigners and next S&P screens stocks according to their size and liquidity. Thus the IFCI is designed to measure the 
composite stock market return of what foreign investors might receive from investing in emerging market securities 
that are legally and practically available to them. Note that the degree of investor accessibility may not be a good proxy 
of actual foreign ownership: a stock that is designated as investible may or may not be owned by foreign investors.  
13 The combination of closely held shares and a sizable proportion of shares that are inaccessible to foreign investors 
can sizably dampen liquidity. The percentage of closely held shares is generally high in East Asian countries; as of 
2004, it was 30 percent in Indonesia, and 40 percent in the Philippines.  In the other countries the figures are lower: 28 
percent in China and Hong Kong (China), 10 percent in Korea, 17 percent in Malaysia, 25 percent in Singapore, and 21 
percent in Thailand—however they are significantly higher than the US at 1.5 percent, Canada at 2 percent and the UK 
at 3.3 percent.    23
Table 7. Key factors affecting the liquidity and efficiency of the securities markets 
Transactions 
costs  
China  Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand  Hong Kong  Singapore 
Withholding taxes  
CGT: 5%.  
WHT on 
interest income: 
10% for QFII 
investors. 
 
CGT: 20%. WHT 
on interest 
income  20%. 
Other tax: 0.1% 
of gross sale 
proceeds is 
withheld by the 
broker as income 
tax for securities 
transactions 
executed on the 
exchange. 
 
CGT: The lower 
of 11% of gross 
sales proceeds 
or 27.5% of net 
capital gains. 
WHT on interest 
income: 27.5% 
. 






CGT: None for 
transactions on 
the exchange.  
WHT on interest 
income: 20% 
 
CGT: 15%. No 
CGT on 
government 
bonds or certain 
quasi- 
government 
bonds. WHT on 
interest income: 
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Notes: CGT = capital-gains tax.  WHT = withholding tax. QFII= Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors. a. The new amendments to the securities law in China leave open the 
possibility of margin trading but do not specify purchases or sales. b. Repo markets in China are available for government bonds but not enterprise bonds. c. Malaysia has just 
announced a partial lifting of the ban on short sales that was imposed during the crisis. Short selling will be limited, however, to fewer than 100 stocks out of the nearly 1,000 
listed.   24
7.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper we explore the relative efficiency of stock markets across countries using 
newly available data on transaction costs and the quality of the informational 
environment of stock markets.   
 
We then develop a framework to understand the linkages between efficiency, 
liquidity and the factors that matter for the efficiency of markets.  To give empirical 
content to the framework, we study the determinants of transactions costs and the quality 
of the informational environment.   
 
We find that certain indicators of the physical and market infrastructure, along 
with certain institutional characteristics of stock markets is associated with lower 
transactions costs. We also find that certain institutional and legal underpinnings are 
more conducive to a better informational environment in stock markets.   
 
This in turn serves as the basis for the policy framework and recommendations for 
the East Asian region. In particular, the region needs to continue to strengthen the 
implementation and enforcement of corporate governance, to further enhance the market 
and institutional infrastructure, and focus on policy measures to foster a larger and more 
diversified investor base, to continue to see gains in the efficiency of their stock markets.   25
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Appendix Table 1. Description of variables and data sources 
 
Variable Description  Source 
    
Dependent variables   
    
Stock Return 
Synchronicity 
Measure of how much individual stock returns move together, or 
are correlated to the market return.  A higher measure of 
synchronicity indicates that there is not much firm-specific 
information, and hence indicates lower efficiency. 
Based on Morck, 









Measure of the implicit and explicit costs of trading in a particular 
market.  It is based on a methodology that exploits the percentage 
of zero-return days in a year.  Since a trade only happens when the 
benefit of doing so exceeds the costs, the relative frequency of 










The percentage of zero-return weeks that are observed for a firm.  





    
Independent variables   
    






Measures the strength of minority shareholder protections against 
directors’ misuse of corporate assets for personal gain. This 







Measures the strength of minority shareholder protections against 
directors’ misuse of corporate assets for personal gain. This 






Measures the strength of minority shareholder protections against 
directors’ misuse of corporate assets for personal gain. This 
particular indicator captures the ability to sue officers and 





A dichotomous variable that indicates whether short sales are 
practiced in a stock market. 




A dichotomous variable that indicates whether stock lending is 
allowed in a stock market. 




Time to confirmation in the settlement cycle for securities traded 
in the stock exchange, provided as x in T + x. 
Handbook of 
Stock Markets. 
Equity Inflows  Portfolio equity flows into the country in a given year.  It includes 






A dichotomous variable that indicates whether any option or 
future derivative is traded in the country. 
Handbook of 
Stock Markets. 
 
 